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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
CHERYL HARDY, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAYNE ] 
L. RIGBY, Insurance Agent, ] 
Defendants-Respondent. ] 
> Docket No. 20582 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Cheryl Hardy, the widow of one 
Lynn Hardy, to recover upon an insurance policy issued by The 
Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") on her late 
husband's life. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint sought to 
recover the amount of the policy and other alleged damages from 
Prudential (including $30,000,000 in punitive damages) for 
denying Mrs. Hardy's claim for insurance benefits (R. at 613-617) 
and sought identical damages against Mr. Rigby -- including the 
$30,000,000 punitive damages -- for "unfair and deceptive 
practices" which never have been defined. (R. at 615, 617.) 
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(Plaintiff has mentioned her claim against Mr. Rigby nowhere in 
her Brief -- or, for that matter, in her Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. at 992-1011.) 
The allegations against him, a non-diverse defendant, apparently 
never were meant to be taken seriously.) Prudential denied the 
Second Amended Complaint's operative allegations and stated, by 
way of defense, that it had been entitled to deny the Hardy claim 
by reason of material misrepresentations of medical history and, 
further, that Cheryl Hardy was precluded from asserting the 
Amended Complaint's demands by her own and her husband's wrong-
ful, inequitable and fraudulent conduct. (R. at 40-46, 627-633.) 
Prudential sued, by Counterclaim, for rescission of the 
Hardy policy on grounds of misrepresentations and/or incorrect 
statements in the insurance application and fraud. (R. at 
40-46.) 
Prudential filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 20, 1984. (R. at 472-475.) The Court ordered hearing 
on the Motion was postponed until completion of discovery. (R. 
at 622-623.) After discovery had been concluded, the Court heard 
arguments on February 15, 1984, a date agreed upon by the par-
ties. (At that time, discovery had been completed and the case 
was set for a bench trial on April 30. (R. at 663.)) On March 
14, 1985, the Court entered Summary Judgment of No Cause of 
Action on the Amended Complaint and simultaneously entered Judg-
ment in Prudential's favor on its Counterclaim for rescission. 
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(R. at 1143-1144.) (After the Court had announced its decision, 
but before the Judgment's entry, plaintiff filed a "Motion to 
Reconsider11; the Court denied that Motion by an Order dated March 
20, 1983. (R. at 1149-1150.)) 
On April 2, 1985, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal 
from the "Judgment of District Court Judge, Dean E. Conder, 
entered in the record on March 14, 1985"; she appealed from no 
other order. Therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction to 
review the proceedings on the Motion to Reconsider and plain-
tiff's evidence on that matter (R. at 1044-1088; PI.. Add, at 
30-33, 37-55, 65-76) is not properly part of the record or 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, at pages 2 through 10 of 
her Brief and her factual claims elsewhere in the Brief, are 
replete with so many misstatements of the record that it is 
necessary to reconstruct the case, almost from the ground up. 
A. The Uncontroverted Facts. Rule 2, Rules of Practice in 
the Third Judicial District, requires: 
(g) The points and authorities in support 
of a dispositive motion shall begin with a sec-
tion that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the movant claims 
no genuine issue exists... . 
(h) The points and authorities in opposition 
to a dispositive motion shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of 
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material facts as to which the party contends 
a genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute 
shall be stated in separate numbered senten-
ces, and shall refer with particularity to 
those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing party rely and, if applicable, shall 
state the numbered sentence or sentences of 
the movant's facts that are disputed. All 
material facts set forth in the statement of 
the movant shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment, unless speci-
fically controverted by the statement of the 
opposing party. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment contained a 
detailed Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, as required by the 
Rule. (R. at 673-691.) Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 1018-1029) did 
not respond "specifically" to any of defendant's Statement of 
Uncontroverted Facts. Even construing the statements of plain-
tiff's Memorandum broadly, the following matters' accuracy is not 
in dispute. 
1. On August 25, 1981, Lynn Hardy, in applying for a 
policy of life insurance with Prudential, was questioned about 
his lifelong medical history by Dr. Joseph Evans, Prudential's 
examining physician, and concealed, in response to specific 
questions, that he had suffered an acute myocardial infarction in 
1974, had been diagnosed as suffering from ongoing serious heart 
disease (i.e. severe coronary occlusions), had been examined for 
heart disease at the University of Utah Medical Center as 
recently as 1979, had been examined at the University of Utah 
High Risk Coronary Consultation Clinic as recently as 1979, had 
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complained of angina pectoris as recently as 1979, and currently 
was taking atromid, a cardiovascular medication. He also con-
cealed the identity of his regular physician, who was a car-
diologist. (R. at 673-675.) 
2. On August 7, 1981, Hardy had made identical conceal-
ments in response to identical questions about his lifelong 
history in a paramedical examination for Prudential. (Ibid.) 
3. On August 10, 1981, Cheryl Hardy, the policy's puta-
tive owner and beneficiary, concealed the same information from 
an Equifax investigator, acting on Prudential's behalf, by 
claiming that Lynn never had been seriously ill, had not recently 
consulted a physician and was taking no regular medication, 
although she knew this was untrue. (R. at 671-677.) 
4. The above statements were untrue and the Hardies 
obviously knew so at the time of their representations. (R. at 
677-682.) 
5. If Mr. or Mrs. Hardy had revealed Lynn Hardy's true 
medical history -- if only for the five years prior to his appli-
cation (e.g., Hardy's atromid medication, his records at the High 
Risk Coronary Clinic describing his heart attack and angiogram, 
his recent angina, etc. (R. at 677-682.)) -- that information 
would have revealed or led to the discovery that he was suffering 
from a serious heart condition. 
6. Hardy, a truck driver, had habitually concealed his 
history of heart disease from medical examiners for the Interstate 
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Commerce Commission and the Department of Transportation. (R. at 
682.) 
7. Hardy lived in fairly constant fear of recurring 
heart trouble and had stated on a number of occasions that he did 
not expect to live past forty-five. (He was forty-two at the 
time of his insurance application.) (R. at 880.) 
8. Even after Lynn Hardy's death, Cheryl Hardy per-
sisted in denying to Richard Stelzner, Prudential's claims 
investigator, that Lynn "had a heart problem" and in denying any 
knowledge of his earlier heart attack. (R. at 671-672.) 
9. The only negative data which Hardy's medical history 
and examination revealed was that his parents and two of his 
fourteen siblings had died of heart attack or stroke and, 
according to an electrocardiogram taken by Prudential, he had a 
slight (.22 second) first degree arterioventricular ("AV") heart 
block. (R. at 683.) 
10. Hardy's AV heart block was too minor to be ratable 
under Prudential's medical guidelines. (R. at 684.) 
11. Hardy's true history of heart attack, occlusion, 
etc. would have revealed that, as of August, 1981, he was suffer-
ing from significant heart disease and was in substantially 
greater danger of early death than his typical contemporary. (R. 
at 684-685.) 
12. The medical history which Hardy provided Pruden-
tial's examiner presented a person manifesting no symptoms of 
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heart disease and in no exceptional danger of early death. 
Hardyfs misrepresentations and omissions would have been com-
pletely plausible to a physician who had access only to the 
information which he provided Prudential in August, 1981. 
(R. at 683; Afft. of Robert B. Wray, M.D., R. at 850-853.) 
13. If Prudential had known the true facts of Hardy's 
condition, it would have rated him stt least a "Special Class 
4" (or ffSP4!f) , which would have entailed a much higher premium 
payment ($398.65 a month rather than $161.65 a month). (R. at 
683.) 
14. Prudential accepted Hardy as an unrated risk 
because his EKG warranted no debits and his family history, taken 
alone, did not warrant sufficient debits for even a Special Class 
1 rating. (R. at 685.) 
15. On August 4, 1981, Cheryl and Lynn Hardy both 
signed Part One of the Prudential application for life insurance 
which stated: "No agent can make or change a contract, or waive 
any of Prudential's rights or needs.ff (R. at 683-684.) 
16. The insurance policy which was accepted by the 
Hardies in October, 1981, stated: "Only a Prudential officer may 
agree to modify this contract, and then only in writing." (R. at 
684.) 
17. Lynn Hardy died of a heart attack on December 4, 
1982. (R. at 689.) 
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18. Prudential's claims investigator discovered the 
true facts of Hardy's medical history, through an inquiry to 
Hardy's cardiologist (who was identified on his death certificate 
but concealed from his insurance application) and follow-up 
inquiries therefrom. (R. at 689.) 
19. Prudential denied the Hardy death claim on the 
ground that information concerning a current heart disease had 
been concealed. (R. at 690.) 
20. Prudential denied coverage on the basis of an 
omitted seven-year-old cardiovascular history and successfully 
litigated the matter in Gilmore v. Prudential Ins. Co., 432 F. 
Supp. 35 (W.D. Va. 1977). It has denied other claims on the 
basis of history more than five years old. (R. at 690-691.) 
21. Wayne Rigby, Prudential's sales agent, did not 
obtain Lynn Hardy's medical history, receive medical reports on 
Hardy during the underwriting process nor act as an underwriter 
of the policy. (R. at 678.) 
In sum, the Hardies concealed from Prudential's examiners 
facts which would have revealed a clearly serious medical con-
dition. It is inconceivable that their omissions were inadver-
tent: people just don't "forget11 massive coronary occulusions, 
heart medication, recent angina or recent monitoring as high-risk 
cardiac patients. 
B. Plaintiff's Factual Allegations. Plaintiff, in an 
attempt to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, has made 
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numerous factual allegations in her Brief. Unfortunately, she 
has not complied with UTAH R. of APP. P. 24fs requirement that a 
brief separately set forth "a statement of facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review" and argument; she has scattered fac-
tual assertions throughout her Brief. Nearly every significant 
factual statement in that Brief is untrue and frequently is based 
upon incompetent evidence. The only feasible way to set the 
record straight, is to discuss plaintiff's misstatements in 
sequence: 
1. Plaintiff claims, at page 3 of her Brief, that 
Hardy 
told Agent Rigby that he had a heart attack in 
1974, seven years earlier [citations omitted.] 
Rigby responded that the heart attack would 
not affect issuance of the policy and that the 
information need not be included in the appli-
cation because Prudential disregards medical 
history beyond five years old [citations 
omitted.] 
A reasonable person could not possibly give credence to 
that statement. On one hand, Mr. Rigby has unequivocally denied 
making such a statement (Rigby Pep, at 9-10, 14.) (Further, 
Prudential claims personnel have testified decisively that sales 
personnel, such as Rigby, never were advised that such a rule 
existed (and, indeed, there was no such rule). (Frankel Pep, at 
16-17; LeRoux Pep, at 41.)) On the other hand, Mrs. Hardy's 
testimony is too much a welter of contradictions to be taken 
seriously. At times, she claimed that Mr. Rigby told her and her 
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husband that they did not have to reveal history more than five 
years old. However, her statements were confused and contradic-
tory. She acknowledged that Mr. Rigby had presented the Hardies 
with an earlier group insurance application in June, 1981, which 
did request only a five-year history (Cheryl Hardy Pep., Exh. A) 
and that "[e]verything would be so muddled between conversations 
that I couldn't speak about one of them out of everything." 
(Hardy Pep, at 31.) She also testified: 
Q. ... All of your recollections of your 
discussions with Mr. Rigby up to the time 
you started talking life insurance, those 
are pretty vague and general? 
A. Yeah. 
.Id. at 34. 
I can't recall [Mr. Rigby] saying that 
all you have to go back is five years. 
Id. at 61 • 
[I think Mr. Rigby said only five-year 
answers were necessary] because that is 
all the further that we went. ... 
Id. at 65. 
... [S]ometimes you hear what you 
want to hear because that is what you are 
listening for. 
J^d. at 71 . 
Well, the only thing that says five 
years on here is question 10 and I believe 
it was question 10 I was asking about. 
Id. at 79. [Note: Question No. 10 of the medical questionnaire, 
which questionnaire Mr. Rigby never had anyway, did request only 
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five years1 history; Questions 7-9, which dealt with heart 
history were not so limited.] 
I think [Mr. Rigby] should have been 
more specific. 
I^d. at 109. 
Mrs. Hardy was consistently clear about only one thing 
in her ever-changing testimony: she insisted that the only 
people present during her discussions with Mr. Rigby were Rigby, 
Lynn Hardy, herself and a stranger, whom she claimed, 
incorrectly, was Launa Perry, the paramedical examiner. (J^ d. at 
51.) After Judgment was entered, Mrs. Hardy offered, in support 
of her Motion to Reconsider, two nearly identically prepared 
affidavits, one by her stepson, Mark Ith, and the other by her 
former daughter-in-law, Jan Hardy, both of whom now claim that 
they were present in the Hardy kitchen when Mr. Rigby told Hardy 
"not [to] worry about the heart attack" or that "the heart attack 
did not matter... ." (£1. Br., Add, at 30-33.) 
To believe plaintiff's story about Mr. Rigby, one first 
would have to pick just which one of Mrs. Hardy's several contra-
dictory statements he wanted to believe and then believe that the 
meeting which she claimed consisted of the Hardies, Mr. Rigby and 
Ms. Perry in fact consisted of five (or six, or seven --
depending on how many more affiants plaintiff can find) people 
clustered in the family kitchen, watching Lynn fill out an 
insurance application. 
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2. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Hardy concealed his 
history of heart disease from a paramedical examiner on August 2, 
1981 "in reliance upon Agent Rigby1s assurance that the old 
heart attack need not be listed... ." (Brief, 3-4.) Inasmuch as 
Mr. Hardy is long dead, that "factual" statement is no more than 
speculation. 
3. Plaintiff claims, at page 5, that Hardy "omitted 
[his history of heart disease] in continuing reliance on Agent 
Rigby's prior instruction that it need not be listed" when he was 
examined by Dr. Evans. Again what the late Hardy did or did not 
rely upon at most could he only surmise. Further, in this case, 
it clearly is not true. Hardy told Dr. Evans about his childhood 
rheumatic fever and his prostrate problems of eleven years 
earlier; he concealed his heart attack of seven years earlier, 
his angina pectoris and his visit to the High Risk Coronary 
Consultation Center of less than two years earlier and his 
current cardiovascular medication. If he believed that he did 
not have to reveal information more than five years old, he would 
have omitted the old prostrate and rheumatic fever information 
and revealed the very recent information of heart disease. 
4. Plaintiff claims, at page 6 of her Brief, that 
Prudential "waived" a rating of the Hardy policy. In fact, as 
Prudential's medical director, Dr. Ketchum, testified, the medical 
history Hardy revealed was "not ratable." (Hardy Pep, at 16-18.) 
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5. Plaintiff claims, at page 6, that the Hardy 
chest x-ray was not reviewed by Prudential until after the policy 
was issued on October 7. The claim file reveals, as plaintiff's 
counsel knows, the chest x-ray was reviewed on September 28. 
(Frankel Pep., Exh. 1 at 00223.) 
6. Plaintiff claims, at page 16 that Dr. Thorne 
stated that Hardy's condition was in remission. The Thorne 
Affidavit (which was filed after the Court ruled on the Motion 
and thus is not properly before the Court), says nothing of the 
sort. (PI. Br., Add, at 53-55.) 
7. Plaintifffs claim at pages 27-28, that Hardy's 
history, as reported to Prudential, required 75 debits, and thus 
required a rating of Special Class 2, is incorrect and looks 
suspiciously like an intentional misstatement. Plaintiff makes 
her claim by attempting to perpetuate a misstatement in the depo-
sition of Marilyn Reed, which was corrected in her affidavit in 
support of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 
942-943) and disposed of specifically in defendants' Concluding 
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 
1115, 1136.) (Plaintiff's footnote 7 represents that, under 
Prudential's underwriting practice, Hardy's AV block which was 
less than .23 seconds would have incurred debits. In fact, it 
would not have. (R. at 1136.) Therefore, there was no interre-
lated impairment and no additional debits.) 
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8. Plaintiff offers, at pages 17, 23, 26, 27 and 30 of 
her Brief, excerpts from Prudential claim histories, which, as 
the record reveals, never were qualified as to completeness or 
otherwise, and thus cannot be offerred in evidence. 
9. Plaintiff insists, at page 37 of her Memorandum, 
that one of the physicians Hardy reported having treated him also 
was knowledgeable of Hardy's heart condition. That physician was 
Dr. Val Sundwall; it repeatedly was established below that the 
attending physician at the time of Hardyfs heart attack was a Dr. 
David Sundwall (R. at 1096; Frankel Pep., Exhibit I at 00068-70). 
Further, it was repeatedly pointed out below that Dr. Val Sundwall 
had signed a Department of Transportation physical examination 
report in January, 1977, stating that Hardy had no history of 
prior heart disease. (R. at 1096.) Obviously, he had no knowl-
edge of a prior heart condition. 
Plaintifffs factual allegations could be dissected line-
by-line. It is sufficient to point out here that her Brief is a 
collection of misstatements, misquotations and conjecture. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Conder's decision to enter Summary Judgment was 
based upon a determination that plaintiff had been unable to 
offer any substantial contravention of the testimony and affida-
vits which Prudential had put before him. Inasmuch as discovery 
had been completed, the case was to be tried to Judge Conder, and 
he had the benefit of several hundred pages of memoranda and 
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exhibits plus over an hour of oral argument, his factual deter-
mination is entitled to great weight. As will be set forth 
below, Judge Conderfs decision in the premises was fully con-
sistent with applicable law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE RECORD HEREIN CLEARLY REVEALS OMISSIONS 
BY THE HARDIES WHICH DEFEAT THEIR CLAIM AND 
WHICH ENTITLE PRUDENTIAL TO RESCISSION. 
Prudential was entitled to deny the Hardy claim and is 
entitled to rescission of his policy under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§13-19-8 (1974 Repl. Vol.), which permits an insurer to reject a 
contestable claim on the basis of lf [m] isrepresentations, omissions, 
concealment of facts, and incorrect statements11 in an insurance 
application, if those misrepresentations, omissions, etc., were: 
(a) fraudulent; or 
(b) material either to the acceptance of the 
risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; 
or 
(c) the insurer in good faith either would not 
have issued the policy or contract, or would 
not have issued, reinstated or renewed it at 
the same premium rate, or would not have issued, 
reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract in 
as large an amount, or would not have provided 
coverage with respect to the hazard resulting 
in the loss, if the true facts had been made 
known to the insurer as required either by the 
application for the policy or contract or 
otherwise. 
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The Section's grounds for denial are disjunctive; any 
one of them will permit an insurer to disallow a claim. It is 
undisputed that Prudential, in good faith, "would not have issued 
... a policy at the same premium ... if the true facts had been 
made known as required ... by the application ..."; it thus was 
entitled, under subsection (c), to refuse coverage. Further, 
there can be no serious dispute that Hardy's omitted history was 
"material ... to acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard 
assumed" by Prudential; it also was entitled to refuse coverage 
under subsection (b).— Indeed, there can be no real question 
that Hardy's repeated concealment of a known and serious medical 
problem was fraudulent; Mrs. Hardy's recovery was barred by sub-
section (a) as well as subsections (b) and (c). 
Hardy's misrepresentations and omissions were fraudulent 
as a matter of law. 
If the insured at the time of making his applica-
tion has knowledge or good reason to know that he is 
afflicted with a disease which renders his condition 
serious, and that thereby his longevity will be preju-
dicially impaired, his statements and representations to 
— Omission of an item as significant as a heart attack 
necessarily is material, as a matter of common sense. It also 
has been held to be material as a matter of law. Gilmore v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., supra at 37 (W.D. Va. 1977) (so holding as 
to a heart attack seven years before the application and entering 
summary judgment for the insurer); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Mardanlou, 607 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1980); Mooneghan v. 
Wabash L. Ins. Co. , 412 F.2d 833, 834 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Ge"eF~v. 
Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. , 273 N.Y. 261, 7 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1937) 
(" [M] isrepresentation of symptoms of heart disease without more 
would undoubtedly void the policies.") (Lehman, CJ^  (emphasis 
added.) 
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the contrary in reply to specific inquiries constitute a 
fraud practiced upon the insurer,.. . 
Prudential Ins, Co, v. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 66, 448 P.2d 722, 723 
(1968) (emphasis added.) (quoting Chadwick v. Beneficial Life 
Ins, Co,, 56 Utah 480, 191 Pac. 240 (1920),) 
The above rule of Chadwick and Johnson is doubly dispo-
sitive. Not only did this Court construe the law authoritatively 
in Johnson; the Legislature enacted Section 31-9-18 after 
Chadwick, It is a well-established canon of statutory interpre-
tation that a legislature, in incorporating a judicially defined 
term into a statute, is presumed to have adopted that earlier 
II interpretation.- E.g., Rivers v. Rosenthal, 634 F.2d 774, 783 
(5th Cir. 1980.) 
2/ 
-' Similarly, in Guardian L. Ins. Co. v. Eagle, 484 F.2d 382 
(5th Cir. 1973), it was held: 
The court was not required to believe, given the 
nature and seriousness of Eagle's condition and the 
frequency, duration and variety of his medical examina-
tions, that he was unaware of his medical history or had 
forgotten about previous treatments. 
Id. at 384. Accord, New York L. Ins. Co. v. McCurdy, 106 F.2d 
181, 187 (10th Cir. 1939) (fl[W]here proof of alleged fraud becomes 
conclusive by uncontradicted evidence ... showing falsehood, con-
cealment and misrepresentations, [the] question of ... fraud 
becomes [a] matter of law... . " ) . 
Finally, in McSweeney v. Prudential Ins. Co., 128 F.2d 660, 
664 (4th Cir. 1942), cert, denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942), the Court 
of Appeals held: 
... [The] fraud ... required to avoid the policy is 
shown to exist where there is a false representation 
as to a material matter, ... false to the knowledge 
of the applicant at the time it is raade[,] ... for 
the purpose of being acted on by the company. ... 
(footnote continued) 
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Misrepresentations such as the Hardies1 consistently 
have been held to authorize rescission of insurance contracts 
and/or dismissal of actions for policy proceeds, frequently by 
summary judgment. In Gilmore v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra at 
36 (W.D. Va. 1977), the applicant, answering the very same 
questions on a Prudential application which Lynn Hardy answered, 
omitted a seven-year-old diagnosis of "a right bundle branch 
block of the heart" -- a matter less serious than a seven-year-
old acute myocardial infarction -- and follow-up visits to his 
doctor as recently as two years before his application. (Ibid.) 
footnote 2 continued 
[It] is idle to inquire further whether there was 
intent to defraud; for the intent to defraud ... is 
the intent to obtain the policy by the false repre-
sentations. ... [W]hether the insured may honestly 
have thought that he had recovered from the serious 
ailment from which he knew that he had suffered and 
for which he had consulted a physician is beside 
the point. Inquiries were addressed to him ... for 
determining whether the policy should be issued; he 
knew that his answers would be ... acted on by the 
company; and, when he made false answers which he 
knew to be false as a basis for such action, 
fraudulent intent ... may reasonably be inferred, 
[citation omitted.] His good faith, under such 
circumstances, is not a matter for speculation, but 
must be determined from a consideration of what he 
has deliberately done. [citation omitted.] 
Accord, Taylor v. Sentry L. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir 
1984); DiBenedetto v. Continental Assur. Co., 414 N.E.2d 1036, 
1037 (Mass. App. 1981); Pendarvis v. Continental Serv. L. & H. 
Ins. Co., 339 So.2d 367, 369 (La. App. 1976); Allen v. America 
Nat'l Ins. Co., 380 S.W.2d 604, 607-608 (Tex. S.Ct. 1964). 
:an 
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The district court found the omissions to be material as a matter 
of law and held: 
There being no controversy as to the misrepre-
sentation and its falsity, this court's deter-
mination of its materiality determines the suit. 
Ibid. 
In Chadwick v. Beneficial L, Ins. Co., supra, 141 Pac. 
at 245-246, the Utah Supreme Court held that it was error to the 
trial not to direct a verdict for the insurer when a significant 
former illness had been inquired about directly and was not 
revealed.— 
II • 
THE RECORD PRESENTS NO BASIS UPON 
WHICH PLAINTIFF CAN AVOID THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF HER HUSBAND'S, AND 
HER OWN, MISREPRESENTATIONS 
A. Contributory negligence is not a defense to 
intentional fraud. It cannot be seriously questioned that the 
Hardies1 acts were fraudulent both as a matter of obvious fact 
and of law. Chadwick v. Beneficial L. Ins. Co., supra. There-
fore, mere negligence by Prudential could not defeat the company's 
right to rescission in any event. Fraud being an intentional 
wrong, the victim's claim will not be defeated by simple negli-
gence. 
3/ 
— The similar cases in which summary judgment had been entered 
for insurers are legion. E.g., Gilmore v. Prudential Ins. Co., 
supra; Mooneghan v. Wabash Ins. Co., supra; Life Ins. Co. of 
North America v. Capps, 660 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1981) ; Davis v. 
Integon L. Ins. Corp., 645 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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The law will seldom allow the plea of contribu-
tory negligence to a wilful wrong* ... [T]he 
modern trend "is certainly toward the doctrine 
that negligence in trusting in a misrepresenta-
tion will not excuse positive wilful fraud or 
deprive the defrauded person of his remedy." 
Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134, 137 (1945). 
... [W]here there has been intentional misrepre-
sentation the common law does not exact a duty 
of due cause or due diligence from the injured 
plaintiff. 
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 430 F.2d 955 (1977) (applying Utah law). Accord, Dugan 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1980). 
Utah requires a plaintiff's neglect to reach at least 
the level of recklessness for his fraud claim to be defeated. 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162, 166 (Utah 1981). Accord, 
Cherkes v. Postal L. Ins. Co., 285 App. Div. 514, 516, 138 
N.Y.S.2d 788, 790 (1955), aff'd without opinion, 309 N.Y. 964, 
132 N.E.2d 328 (1956). To require otherwise would be to reward 
any intentional deceiver lucky enough to spot an oversight by his 
victim. The rule should be strictly applied in this case where 
plaintiff was not merely a beneficiary, but the owner of the 
policy, an applicant for the policy and an active participant in 
the fraud. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to con-
sider the Johnson-Holdsworth-Kohler rule in a case involving an 
insurance misrepresentation. However, there appears to be no 
reason -- and there is no suggestion in the Utah case law -- that 
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a different rule should apply.— Indeed, this case is particu-
larly appropriate to the rule's application. Ordinarily, the 
plaintiff in a life insurance claim case was completely unin-
volved in the application and innocent of any misrepresentation. 
In this case, Mrs. Hardy herself made an intentional misrepresen-
tation to the Equifax investigator (that Mr. Hardy had no history 
of serious disease, etc.) and obviously was aware of, and privy 
to, the misrepresentations which he had made to Prudential and 
others of his medical history. She was a conscious wrongdoer who 
knew that she could profit handsomely from her husband's likely 
death. 
B. Even if the defense of contributory negligence were 
available as a matter of law, Mrs. Hardy could not successfully 
invoke it here. 
1. There is no possible basis for claiming that 
Prudential was negligent in its attention to Hardy's first degree 
AV block. A first degree arterioventricular block is a minor 
abnormality. That abnormality was considered in the Hardy 
underwriting. It warranted no debit or rating of the policy. 
Hardy's family history warranted a debit, but not a large enough 
debit to cause the policy to be rated. (Ketchum Pep, at 16-18.) 
— There really could be no reason for a lesser rule; good faith 
on the applicant's part is necessary to the whole insurance pro-
cess and thus is mandated by the courts. E.g., Cohen, Friedlander 
& Martin Co. v. Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co., 166 F.2d 63, 66 
(6th Cir. 1948). 
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Plaintiff's counsel has made much of the notion that 
Hardy's first degree AV block and family history were ignored 
"red flags" of possible heart trouble. (e.g., Ketchum Pep, at 
48.) In fact, Prudential treated that information as abnormal 
data -- "red flags", if you will -- and debited the application 
accordingly. (IxL at 48-49.) (Of course, plaintiff's pleadings 
have not alleged that Prudential's treatment of the family 
history was negligent, so that claim apparently is waived.) The 
debits were insufficient for even an SP1 rating. (Ibid.) How-
ever, if the truth of Hardy's medical history had been known, he 
would have been, a_t minimum, rated SP4 -- a much higher rating 
entailing much higher premiums. 
Plaintiff has suggested that Hardy's first degree AV 
block and family history were so compelling that Prudential 
should have known that he probably suffered from serious heart 
disease. This simply is not so. As Dr. Robert B. Wray, a highly 
respected cardiologist, testified: 
4. [Hardy's purported medical history, 
reports of examination, ICC physical examina-
tion reports and EKG results] (including 
Hardy's family history of some significant 
heart disease and EKG results), if considered 
alone presents a person manifesting no symp-
toms of premature coronary atherosclerosis or 
other heart disease and in no exceptional 
danger of early death, and that the presence 
of a first degree AV block on the included EKG 
was a non-specific finding which could have 
been congenital or a result of the childhood 
rheumatic fever reported ... ; 
5. That a statement by Mr. Hardy that 
he had no history or symptoms of cardiovascular 
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disease or chest pains would have been comple-
tely plausible to a physician who had access 
only to the information [Hardy provided]; 
9. That [Hardy's true history] presents 
a person who, as of August 25, 1981, was suf-
fering from significant coronary atherosclero-
sis (even if he presently was experiencing no 
subjective symptoms or disability), would con-
tinue to suffer from significant heart 
disease, and, conservatively, would be deemed 
to have a 2-4% annual chance of death from 
heart disease -- a substantially greater risk 
of early death than that of his typical con-
temporary. 
(R. at 851-852.) 
Plaintiff's claim of negligent inattention to Hardy's 
examination results and family history is wholly without 
substance. 
2. There is no possible basis for claiming that 
Prudential was negligent in not performing a more extensive 
examination of Mr. Hardy. Prudential's examination of Mr. Hardy 
was appropriate. As Dr. Wray, who is both a teacher and clini-
cian, testified: 
6. That further examinations and/or 
tests (such as an exercise EKG or -- more 
drastic -- a cardiac catheterization) were not 
indicated by the information in Attachment "A" 
and that not performing such examinations or 
tests cannot be considered negligent; 
7. That, according to the medical 
records included to Attachment "B" hereto, 
Lynn Hardy had undergone exercise EKG's as 
recently as August 1, 1979 and the results of 
those exercise EKG's were negative (i.e., not 
indicative of symptomatic heart disease); 
(R. at 852.) 
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3. The other possible claims of contributory 
negligence which plaintiff has suggested are without merit. 
Plaintiff has suggested that, because Hardy had some 
family history of heart disease, Prudential should have realized 
he was misleading it when he said he had no history of heart 
disease. (This can be characterized as the you-should-have-
known-he-was-lying defense -- one with interesting implications.) 
This claim is unsubstantial. As Dr. Wray has noted, Hardy's 
misrepresentations were completely plausible, if a physician had 
only the information Hardy provided Prudential. (R. at 851.) He 
appeared to be a healthy man with some unhealthy relatives. 
Plaintiff also suggested that Prudential should have 
questioned Dr. Val Sundwall about Hardy's possible heart con-
dition, suggesting that he might have told the company about the 
1974 heart attack because, he allegedly had been Hardy's 
attending physician at the time of that attack. (Dr. Val 
Sundwall is mentioned on the Hardy application as the doctor who 
treated him for a prostate infection ten years earlier.) Counsel 
is wrong on several points: Hardy's physician at the time of his 
attack was Dr. David Sundwall (whom Hardy meticulously omitted 
from his medical history, just as he omitted anyone or anything 
else who could have revealed his fraud). (Frankel Pep., Exh. 1 
at 0057-60.) Dr. Val Sundwall obviously never knew of Hardy's 
heart attack; he certified Hardy's false statement of no history 
of heart disease on his 1977 ICC examination. (Idi. at 00176.) 
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Plaintiff also has suggested that Prudential was negligent 
in not requesting a record of Hardyfs hospitalization for a 
prostate infection at Cottonwood Hospital ten years earlier (even 
though the prostatitis was unimportant from an underwriting 
standpoint (Marilyn Reed Pep, at 81-82)), because a request for a 
1971 prostatitis history, by luck, might also have turned up a 
record of the 1974 heart attack (which, coincidentally, was 
treated initially at Cottonwood Hospital). This suggestion is 
whimsical at best. Hardy's earlier Cottonwood Hospital chart --
assuming it could be obtained after ten or more years -- could be 
expected to show only the course of his prostate treatment and 
general physical data, and his blood count. (R. at 836-38.) 
There was no reasonable basis for expecting it to contain 
anything material.— 
An insurer is required to exercise due care only in ana-
lyzing what an insured told it (which it may assume is truthful); 
it is not compelled to search for omissions. 
[There is no] burden on the insurer of looking 
suspiciously and searchingly beyond the facts 
disclosed for undisclosed ailments [citation 
omitted]. The test is not one of what a prudent 
—' Negligence does not consist of failing to make an investiga-
tion which might have proved serendipitous. An action's reason-
ableness is determined by what ordinarily was foreseeable at 
the time. Sharpsburg Sand Co. v. Monongahela R. Consol. Coal & 
Coke Co., 145 Fed. 424, 426 (W.D. Pa. 1906); Garafano v. Neshobe 
Beach Club, Inc., 126 Vt. 566, 238 A.2d 70, 71 (1967) ; Daugherty 
v. Hunt, 110 Ind. App. 264, 38 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1941); Sandidge 
v. Atchinson, I. & S.F. Ry. Co., 193 Fed. 867, 872 (9th Cir. 
1912). 
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inquiry would have revealed. The question is 
whether the information given, although partial, 
was sufficiently indicative of something more to 
be tantamount to notice of the unrevealed. 
Cherkes v. Postal L. Ins. Co., supra, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 790 
(emphasis added).—7 
In reversing a judgment in plaintiff's favor, the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Apolskis v. Concord L. 
Ins. Co., 445 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1971): 
[T]he district court thought plaintiff should 
prevail because Concord made no investigation 
of the insured's medical records as it was 
authorized to do under the application. This 
... is clearly contrary to Illinois law. An 
insurance company need not make any independent 
investigation and may rely on the truthfulness 
of answers contained in an insurance applica-
tion at least if there is nothing to put it on 
notice that certain answers may be false. 
Prudential is entitled to judgment of rescission as 
a matter of law* The information the Hardies withheld unquestion-
ably comes within the purview of UTAH CODE ANN. §31-19-8 and 
plaintiff's only asserted affirmative defenses are demonstrably 
without substance. 
—' In Cherkes, the insurer had been told that the applicant had 
had a gall bladder operation. The company used that information 
in its underwriting, but did not make further inquiry of the 
insured's personal physician or of the hospital where the gall 
bladder surgery was performed. If it had made such inquiries, it 
might have (in that case, probably" would have) learned of appli-
cant's omitted kidney condition. (Id. at 790.) Plaintiff's 
contributory negligence claim in Cherkes was like Mrs. Hardy's 
Cottonwood Hospital claim -- only better. The Appellate Division 
(per Judge Peck) held that it was error to submit the question of 
the insurer's due care to the jury, vacated judgment for the 
beneficiary and ordered the complaint dismissed. (_Id. at 790-791.) 
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C. Plaintiff's allegation of "discrimination" cannot 
entitle her to recovery herein. Plaintiff appears to contend 
that Prudential is barred from enforcing its rights by a supposed 
breach of a supposed obligation to treat all claimants alike. 
Apparently, plaintiff argues that, whether or not Prudential was 
justified by its contract or by law in denying the Hardy claim, 
it was barred from exercising that right by an alleged deviation 
from a past claims practice. 
Plaintiff apparently claims that, in denying the Hardy 
claim for omissions, including omission of a heart attack seven 
years before the application, Prudential deviated from an alleged 
internal practice of not considering information more than five 
years old in claims reviews. Plaintiff also claims -- although 
without legal rationale -- that her misrepresentations and those 
of her husband somehow may be excused by Prudential's alleged 
deviation from an internal procedure. 
This claim fails on several grounds. 
1. The disposition of this claim was consistent 
with Prudential's former practice. This case is virtually iden-
tical to Gilmore v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, a 1977 case 
arising from a 1974 application which omitted a seven-year-old 
diagnosis. Similarly, other claims regularly are reviewed on the 
basis of the insured's entire history, not just the last five 
years. (R. at 954.) If Prudential's claims personnel needed 
a "precedent", they had several. (Although courts have looked to 
past practice as evidence when materiality is in question -- it 
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is not here -- no court appears to have held that an insurer must 
defend a lawful decision as also being consistent with disposi-
tion of some prior claim.) An episode of serious disease without 
follow-up treatment and monitoring for five years would be most 
unusual. (Ibid.) However, in these unusual cases, Prudential 
does deny claims when the omission was material. 
2. The Hardy application omitted material history 
which was much less than five years old, such as his 1979 angina 
pectoris and treatment. The claimfs denial was not based upon an 
omission of past treatments, but omission of a diagnosis of what 
plaintiff admits by her own pleadings was a present ,fserious 
heart disease."— 
3. Plaintiff has offered no basis in legal prin-
ciple for claiming that alleged "discrimination" bars Prudential 
from enforcing its rights. Certainly, waiver is not available 
to her. A contracting party is free to enforce its current 
rights, regardless of whether it chose to act differently at 
some other time. It waives a right only if it intends to 
relinquish that right and "distinctly11 communicates that intent 
—' If an insurer could not investigate beyond a five-year limit, 
no lifelong condition, no matter how serious (heart disease, 
hemophilia, cirrhosis or whatever), could be considered for 
underwriting or claims purposes more than five years after its 
positive diagnosis -- a simply silly suggestion. 
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to the other party. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 
P.2d 308, 311-312 (1936). Accord, United States v. Chichester, 
312 F.2d 275, 283 (9th Cir. 1963); Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. 
Lord Mech. Contractors, 242 Or. 1, 406 P.2d 556, 567 (1965). 
There is no evidence that Prudential ever intended to waive any 
rights or that it ever communicated such an intention to the 
Hardies. As has been pointed out above, Prudential keeps its 
claims practices confidential and does not even disseminate them 
to its field employees. 
The foregoing rules concerning waiver apply to insurance 
policies, which "are governed by the rules applicable to the 
construction and enforcement of contracts in general." Williams 
v. First Colony L. Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). It 
specifically has been held, in Burr v. Lane, 10 Wash. App. 412, 
517 P.2d 988, 995 (1974): 
The insured cannot justifiably rely on the 
insurer's words or conduct of which he is 
unaware. [citations omitted.] 
. . . . 
...[W]hile waiver is a voluntary and 
unilateral relinquishment of a known right, it 
cannot be made operative upon an insured 
ignorant of its relinquishment. 
Plaintiff's claim is based upon an alleged claims practice which 
counsel claims to have discovered since the litigation's commen-
cement. The Hardies admittedly were ignorant of this claimed 
(and, in fact, non-existent) practice at all times material to 
the action. There could have been no waiver in these premises. 
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4. Plaintiff is asking the Court, in effect, to 
become an arbiter of what claims decisions are equivalent to 
others. (Claims decisions often turn on such matters as the 
claims personnel's appraisal of an insured's good faith.) This 
is a most unpromising chore, which could take days of unproduc-
tive litigation. 
5. Plaintiff's claim that five-year old histories 
may not be a basis for rescission is inconsistent with the 
policy of UTAH CODE ANN. §31-19-8 that misrepresentation of facts 
material to a risk insured or a premium charged on fraudulent 
representations are grounds for rescission. 
III. 
THE HARDIES' MISREPRESENTATIONS CANNOT 
BE EXCUSED BY CLAIMS AGAINST MR. RIGBY 
A. The taking of Hardy's medical history was not part 
of Mr. Rigby's responsibility and his knowledge of an alleged 
statement about it cannot be imputed to Prudential. As has been 
noted above, there is no substantial evidence supporting plain-
tiff's claims about Mr. Rigby. Even if there was such evidence, 
it could not change the result. There are many cases in which an 
agent's knowledge about an omitted item of medical history has 
been imputed to his insurance company. However, as far as 
defendants' research indicates, all such cases involved agents 
who had taken the medical history themselves. (This is not 
surprising; insurance agents take most medical histories. Most 
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companies make an exception only for large—usually six-figure— 
policies.) The general rule of agency is that: 
...the knowledge of the agent will be imputed 
to the principal only when it is relevant...to 
the matters entrusted to the agent... 
Roderick Timber Co. v. Willapa Harbor Cedar Prod., Inc., 29 Wash. 
App. 311, 627 P.2d 1352, 1355 (1981); Accord, J. A. Jones Const. 
Co. v. Englert Eng. Co., 438 F.2d 3, 6 (6th Cir. 1971); Sutton 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Notre Dame Arena Inc., 108 NH 437, 237 A.2d 
676, 679 (1968). 
The purpose of the above limitation is simple and sen-
sible. If every bit of information known by every employee of a 
large organization were imputed to that organization, a company 
would be bound by information which never reached those with 
functional responsibility. In this case, Mr. Rigby was not 
responsible for taking Hardyfs history. If Hardy had told him he 
had had a heart attack—which he did not—Rigby could have 
assumed that Hardy would be equally truthful with an examining 
physician. (It should be noted that not even the new affidavits 
claim that Rigby advised Hardy to conceal anything. They simply 
say that he told him that the information was not necessary. He 
reasonably would have assumed that Hardy would be forthcoming if 
he were told that the information was necessary.) It is undis-
puted that Mr. Rigby did not participate in the underwriting of 
the policy and, therefore, medical information would not have 
reached him for review. Uncontroverted Facts Nos. 5-6. 
B. The Hardies are estopped from asserting their claim 
of Rigby1s knowledge. Lynn and Cheryl Hardy deliberately with-
held information from Prudential. When an insured knew of a 
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falsity of a statement which he made in an application, he, as a 
participant in the deception, is barred from interposing the 
agent's knowledge. Serdenes v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 319 A.2d 858, 
863 (Md. App. 1974). 
C. The application, which both Hardies signed on August 
4, 1981, stated clearly that an agent could not alter the 
contract or waive Prudential's "rights or needs." The policy 
also provided that only an officer could vary the contract's 
terms. (Id. , Item 41.) An agent who lacks apparent authority to 
8/ 
waive his principal's rights cannot do so.— It repeatedly has 
been held that an agent's acts of the sort claimed against Mr. 
Rigby cannot defeat the company's rights, if the insurer has made 
a reservation such as Prudential's. Blanton v. John Hancock 
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 168, 171 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 
463 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1972) ("When an agent's authority is 
expressly limited, either by statute or ... an insurance policy, 
—' Only an agent who is authorized to waive a principal's < 
rights can do so. A waiver is an "intentional" relinquishment of 
a known right (Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, supra, 61 P.2d at 
311-312) and, certainly, only an authorized employee can for-
mulate a corporation's intent. Several courts have held specifi-
cally that no act of an agent can waive a principal's rights if 
the agent lacks authority to make a waiver; there appear to be no ( 
cases to the contrary. Globe Indem. Co. v. Cohen, 106 F.2d 687, 
691-692 (3d Cir. 1939), cert, denied, 309 U.S. 660 (1940), 
Public Warehouses of Matanzas, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Maryland, 77 F.2d 831, 833 (2d Cir. 1935); Coates v. St. Louis 
Clay Products Co., 69 F.Supp. 902, 905 (E.D. Mo. 1946). 
i 
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the insured is on notice ... and cannot rely on an agent's 
representative to the contrary.11); ACF Produce, Inc. v. 
Chubb/Pacific Indem. Group, 451 F.Supp. 1095, 1099 (E.D. Pa. 
1978); APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §9121 (1968). 
In this case, not only did the application provide 
that an agent could not waive any of the company's "rights or 
needs11, the policy provided that only an officer of the company 
could modify the contract, "and then in writing." Such clauses 
repeatedly have been held to preclude waiver of a company's 
rights by an agent. E.g., Burr v. Lane, supra; Ayers v. Kidney, 
333 F.2d 812, 814 (6th Cir. 1964.) 
D. The Utah Insurance Code provides that an insurance 
contract shall consist only of the written instrument setting 
forth the contract of insurance (UTAH CODE ANN. §31-19-11) and no 
modification of a policy (which includes a waiver of its terms) 
"shall be effective unless in writing executed by the insurer ...." 
(UTAH CODE ANN. §31-19-26.) Wickes v. State Farm Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 350, 496 P.2d 267, 269 (1972) ("[A]n 
insurance policy must be enforced as written, and ... cannot be 
changed in favor of the insured except by a writing signed by the 
insurer.") The medical examiner's questionnaire requiring a 
lifetime history and Hardy's verification, as well as the 
Hardies' application (which accepted the limits on Mr. Rigby's 
agency), all are part of the policy (Frankel Pep., Exh. I at 
00245, 00266), which plaintiff now seeks to modify. The policy 
cannot be modified as plaintiff asks. 
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E. The Hardy claim's denial resulted from Hardy's 
misstatements which thus cannot be connected to what Mr. Rigby 
may have said. A claim cannot be asserted in tort unless it is 
11
 identifiable with some definiteness11 to defendant's alleged act. 
Anthan v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 521 F. Supp. 
1, 6 (E.D. Mo. 1981). Accord, Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 
564 F.2d 531, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, 
A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981). The Hardy claim against 
either Prudential or Mr. Rigby does not meet this test. Mr. 
Rigby's alleged remarks to Hardy could not have "caused" him to 
answer falsely the questions put to him by Dr. Evans and Ms. 
Perry. (Further, plaintiff is barred by the terms of the appli-
cation and insurance policy from setting up a claim against 
Prudential based on Mr. Rigby1s alleged statements, as has been 
pointed out above.) 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF HAS MADE OUT 
NO CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH 
Nothing in the record could support a claim of bad faith 
herein. An insurer's obligation of good faith is "only one 
aspect of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in all 
contracts." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 401 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 
1985.) Plaintiff's claim of bad faith is wholly incompatible 
with the definition of that term accepted in Utah law. 
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Plaintiff's "bad faith11 claim further is incompatible 
with the prevailing construction of the term "bad faith" itself. 
This Court has defined "bad faith" as the absence of "good 
faith", which is 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no 
intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the 
activities in question will, [sic] hinder, 
delay or defraud others. [citing Tacoma Assoc, 
of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 458, 
433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967).] 
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). In Cady (which 
was brought under a "bad faith" litigation statute (UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-27-56 (1983 Supp.)), the Court held that "bad faith" 
requires a finding of no honest belief in the act's propriety or 
a specific intent to take unconscionable advantage or to oppress 
or defraud. ]A., 671 P.2d at 152. The Court has defined "bad 
faith" elsewhere as "the deliberate doing of something the actor 
knows to be wrong or erroneous." Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 
Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619, 624 (1940). Nothing in this record 
suggests that Prudential was motivated by anything but an honest 
belief that the Hardy claim was without merit (just as a court 
had found the Gilmore claim to be without merit). To claim "bad 
faith" in these premises is frivolous. 
Neither UTAH CODE ANN. §31-1-8, 31-27-1(1) nor the 
Insurance Department regulations cited by plaintiff at pages 63 
and 64 of her Appendix may create a private right of action going 
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beyond that of Beck, First, Prudential has done nothing viola-
tive of those statutes or regulations; second, a private right of 
action cannot be inferred from those regulatory laws and rules. 
The legislative intent to grant or withhold 
a private right of action for the violation of 
a statute, or the failure to perform a statu-
tory duty, is determined primarily from the 
form or language of the statute. The nature 
of the evil sought to remedied, and the pur-
pose the statute was intended to accomplish, 
may also be taken into consideration. In this 
respect, the general rule is that a statute 
which does not purport to establish a civil 
liability, but merely makes provision to 
secure the safety or welfare of the public as 
an entity, is not subject to a construction 
establishing a civil liability. 
Wick Realty, Inc. v. Napili Sands Maui Corp., 620 P.2d 750, 754 
(Haw. App. 1980) (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1974), a securities case, this Court held: 
While that section [UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-1, , 
which is identical to Section 10b of the 
Securities Exchange Act] makes certain prac-
tices unlawful, it does not provide for a pri-
vate right of action for its violation. The 
plaintiffs urge this court to fashion a 
remedy, but we are of the opinion that it is a 
matter best left to the legislature. 
.Id. at 808. 
In the present case, the presumption against a private 
right of action is particularly compelling. Chapter 27 of the 
Insurance Code specifically provides both criminal and adminis-
trative penalties for violation of its terms or of any regulation 
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promulgated under it. (UTAH CODE ANN. §§31-27-1,2.) The legis-
lature created a comprehensive scheme of duties and penalties to 
be enforced only by the Insurance Commissioner and public 
authorities. There is no suggestion of an intent to create a 
private right of action or defense based on violations, real or 
imagined, of the Chapter. 
V. 
PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED 
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
Plaintiff's purported factual contentions consist prin-
cipally of Mrs. Hardy's wholly implausible testimony (and her 
relatives' belated and obviously contrived affidavits) plus the 
untimely affidavit of Dr. Thorne (Pi.. Add, at 53-54.) The Hardy 
testimony is not worthy of further comment. The Thorne affidavit 
states simply that Hardy had had no recent symptoms (Id. at 54, 
§4) (which does not contradict Dr. Wray's statement that, symp-
toms or none, he still had a serious occlusion and reduced life 
expectancy) and that his family history, smoking, etc. suggested 
"potential cardiac abnormalities" (Id. at 55, §8) (which does not 
contradict Dr. Wray's statement that such potential indications 
are not diagnostic of actual disease and that Hardy had concealed 
the existence of such disease). 
In sum, none of plaintiff's factual claims are supported 
by "substantial" evidence and, thus, there can be no "genuine" 
issue of fact left for decision. Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461 , 
464 (1st Cir. 1975). Accord, Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 
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102, 106 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied,
 : U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 
392 (1984); Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. 
Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
As the Utah Supreme Court has held, a party's testimony 
which, "besides being self-serving, was inconsistent" with the 
evidence derived from all other sources, could not defeat summary 
judgment. Anderson v. Beneficial Fire and G. Co., 21 Utah 2d 
173, 442 P.2d 993 (1968). Accord, Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. 
Sylk, 481 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1972); Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives 
v. Department of Commerce, 576 F. Supp. 405, 410 (D.D.C. 1983). 
VI. 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT 
PRUDENTIAL'S RIGHT OF RESCISSION 
IS WITHOUT BASIS IN STATUTE 
OR THE CASE LAW 
Prudential is entitled to rescission of the Hardy policy 
as a matter of law. As the Utah Supreme Court held in Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1234, 1247 (Utah 1980): 
The plaintiff in an action for fraud has 
the option to rescind the transaction and 
recover the purchase price or to affirm the 
transaction and recover damages. The choice 
... belongs to the victim of the fraud and a 
choice cannot be forced upon him. 
The Dugan decision, which was made in the context of a 
fraud case, is consistent with the general rule of rescission. 
A party who has been induced to enter into a 
contract by a material misrepresentation of 
fact has the option of ... avoiding the 
contract at his election . ... [I]f he 
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force for two years during the insuredfs lifetime. (UTAH CODE 
ANN. §31-22-3.) No applicant would have a reason to tell the 
truth on an application, if the only sanction for misrepresenting 
a risk (and thus saving potentially large premiums) were paying 
back the higher premiums out of the eventual recovery -- and not 
even having to do that if the lie was undiscovered for more than 
two years. 
No reported decision, as far as diligent research can 
determine, ever has qualified an insurer's right to rescind for 
misrepresentation. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court specifically 
has held that concealment of "an essential element in estimating 
risk11, without more, entitles an insurer to rescind a policy. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mardenlou, 607 P.2d 291, 293 
(Utah 1980) 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Judgment shall be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
RICHARD B. FERRARI 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
Document and Record Reference 
Judgment f! at ] 1 43-11 144 
Order Scheduling Motion i i Miiiimdry 
Judgmentr R. 622-623 
Order Denying Motion 1:<J Hieconsiduj,, 
R. at 1149-1150 
Affidavit of Robert B. Wray, 
R. at 850-853 
Part I, Prudential Application, 
Frankel Dep. Exh , I at 00245 
Part II, Prudential Application; 
Medical Hi story Frankel Dep, 111:.HII 
at 00266 
Marilyn Reed Attidavit, 
- at 942 
Claims Manual Page re: 
R at 1136 
Cottonwood Hospital Discharge, 
Frankel Deposit:ry_ Exhibit 
I at 00068-70 
l.);i . Val Sundwal r 
R, at 1096 
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COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAY*': 
RIGBY, Insurance Aaent 
P1 a i :\ t , f : ' : 
G r a r *• i ~~r ::" *- ~4- -
n n U : L f i j « . L ~ : 
P l e a d i n g s , ?arie 
ORDER 
C i v i l No . C 8 3 - 7 1 9 5 
>K "zicnfi !•:: . :.* ' ' ! ' . ' - : ;ompe 
r,^ V j a i n s t D e f e n d a ~ " ~ 
: . . . J primary , ^dvj^eir 
;r. . e u u l a r ; * h e a r : re; bt : 
I „n^ D i s c - e n ar.n 
~ ":" . d a c e o : 
: . ^ r ^ a ^ c .
 : Air-en 
e r e t n e H n a r a b l e 
was r e p r t o t n L u w -;. u i K ^ ^ i , - : ^ ; d e f e n d a n t s w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by 
R i c h a r d ; F e r r a r i , 
Tire; 
e x a m i n e d t i *• r e l e v a n t .. * .* r : e x n i b i t . : , rii.* e n t e r t h e : i * ~ 
I T I S n r p p p / PRDEPEP t h a t * 
;. (] ) : .. - - Mnpany . * . - . - . - . 
produce the remaining f: lus identifier r t -
McConfc 
Jthned 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- z -
.Request' f o r P r o d u c t i o n of Documents , which f i l e s s h a l l be produced 
a t P r u d e n t i a 3 "s Nor t h - C e n t r a l Home O f f i c e ::i n Minneapol i s , Mi imp-
,•;; ')ta a I: B i: • s a sonab ] e t :i i rie tc be agr ee« 1 u| m III») I lit \ ia i t i t ' 
m a t t e r of s a n c t i o n s i s r e s e r v e d f o r fi l t u r e h e a r i n g . • _ ••• 
•
 ;
 (2) Th/e heard ng on de fendan t s" ' Mot i o n s f o r Summary Judgment 
: »i I t i i n i :=!:<:l w:i t l :i, : I it d a t e i i:i: i t i ] 1: ::: t:::l i pa r t i e s have comple t ed d i s -
*-very. By October 15, 1984, each party i s to provide the other 
wxtn a 1 :i st ' r :' * "' " ,r" r 2i na :ii n :ii i :t ::j d:i s 20^ rery 
^ j j ^ . q A^WI. L.tC . uxt .„, -, - ar "ih-liiierns t~ ^ l ead inc r s 
-> t a l l :> . i D e r a i l a. . u- : -•: - i .jsr e R<- r e q u i ^ s - a i r . r ; : r" 
Ameiii P l e a d i n g s and t n e p roposed amen sea i leacsinas f*i i t h e r e w i t h , 
. DATED t h i s : v -• ? r t o b e ? ^o-i. 
By 
( "District Judge TTPST 
feEY 
Certificate of Hand-Delivery /p /^J^J(Ysrts&4\*~l 
I HEREBY CERTIFY tha- * r JC ar: 
¥^ :i« : t ob« -: , i J C 4 , db . ^ . ; ..;Vw 
, Richard B. Ferrari, Esq. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
. 310 South Main Street 
Suite 1200 
Salt LaV.e -r.ity, Utah 84] 11 
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IflLMED] 
F'.L£D !N Ci.^F.K o OFFICE 
Ga't UJ-0 County Utah 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
RICHARD B. FERRARI (Bar No. 1064) 
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-3300 
I 11 n:iw 'i'• 1111 Hi | 1'inl,\wi s 
IN THE DISTRICT COUR' ' ^ _ _-.;_ COUNTY | 
STATE OK UTAH 
I 
I 
' ! 
ORDER : j 
i 
Civil No. C-83-7195 ! 
t 
! 
f 
T h i s "na t te r hav ing come b e f o r e t he Court on " a' ' : f r V -
i 1 «i 11 liiiiii III l\i I (Mil1 iili'i I In 1 li,nni?,«Hindiiiiii hot isiinii inure i m d^.;.cd 
F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1985 , on the r e g u l a r law and mot ion c a l e n d a r on 
March 1 , \ 1985 , Dan P. Hushnel l and M e r r i l I F, Ne l son , E s q s , 
mi i ! i < i i i J L » , i I p | » * » a i t • II in in in 1 1 1 • » 1 1 «-i 1 I 1 1 1 11 i i i in in II i i II ii in in 11 h i i ' 11 r ) i i in mi' II i mi i II r i
 f 
Esq, having appeared on behalf ot defendants , and I lit1 tour I., 
1
 ,ivi!H» i o n s i d e r e d t ho s t a t e m e n t s aid s u b m i s s i o n s of counse l and 
h a v i n g r e - e x a m i n e d l hu I I J I M U M I I , li.o i ny, del erui i ncd lliiiil i t s 
Memorandum D e c i s i o n should be r e a f f i r m e d , 
1119 
>5i Ccfurt 
U'<2^ 
Deputy Ciork 
UIKHYI HM'M'iY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA and 
WAYNE L. RIGBY, 
Defendants. 
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io SO ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 
s den I ed . 
DATED t h i s 2 t> day of March, 1985. 
,^ .A/-
DEANSICONDER 
District Judge 
•J* ***** y f 
*r •-
IS 
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WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
RICHARD B. FERRARI 
JOSEPH T. DUNBECK 
310 South Main Street, 12th Floo, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
"' CHERYL HARDY, 
'. Plaintiff, 
i 
r 
i' vs. 
• THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
1
 COMPANY OF AMERICA and 
! WAYNE L. RIGBY, 
I • 
i; Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT B. WRAY, M.D. 
^ivil No. C-83-7195 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT 'LAKE 
ROBERTS. W RAY, M.D., being first duly sw or nf deposes 
1 Tl: iat 1: :ie is a physician and surgeon, engaged in the 
extJLusivtf • - ce of c ardi ol ogy; - '•'' 
2 ' 1 1: B > I: I: i • e :I s a I € • 11 c * : f 11: :i c A:i i i c an Coil
 t 
f a r d i o l o g v a n d a D i p l o m a t e o f t h e A m e r i c a n B o a r d s o f I n t e r " a l 
Ml fill 11, in mi in mi1 iri in nil "I HI i nil in n v -i«, mi I ,ii in I n M J in 
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faculty of the Schoo] of Medicine ot the University of Utah from 
1971 to 1979f a c h i e v i n g t h e rank of A s s i s t a n t P r o f e s s o r of Mer 
c i n e , i mi I i I p i e s n i l I \ i ii l I in i ii I fibs i ii'iitt I "ill of to hi 11 i I NMIH e 
1 the U n i v e r s i t y n! Utah? 
1 Tim it he h a s r e v i e w e d ih t f o l l o w i n g documents : 
a . Attachment " / " irons i s t i n n ! c t medica l h i <? t r i , 
and r e p o r t s of e x a m i n a t i o n , e l e c t r o c a r d i o g r a m ill11! hi I r e s u l t s , 
r e p o r t s of I n t e r s t a t e Commerce Commission p h y s i c a l examina-
tjnn< and ii p r i smi i i l li i s 111 r ,' » nifiniiU y iippat IMI I \\ nil I In I ih 
Lynn Hardy; • . . -
h Attachment "B" , r o n s i s t i n g o t v a r i o u s m e d i c a l 
r e c o i J s , a p p a r e n t l y I I lie Id le Lynn llruily; 
I J i ia t , in r n s o p t i o n , At tachment vh" ( i n c l u d i n g 
H a n i , f am i I
 r llii'l i , i I < im l. 11 in i f i i i-inf h e a r ! i l i spasn rjnnl I F "*» 
r e s u l t s ! » if c o n s i d e r e d a l o n e , p r e s e n t s a p e r s o n niidi mi t e s t i n g in 
symptoms of p r e m a t u r e c o r o n a r y a t h e r o s c l e r o s i s o r e t h e r hea r t 
d i s e a s e IJM I in in c u i r ^ l JUIIUIII ili-iii|i'i 11 I till 1 jf iIra I Ii iiii I llliiil 1 I i 
p r e s e n c e of a f i r s t d e g r e e A' r !\ ' on the i in?lurlei1 EKG was a 
n o n - s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g which CJUXU iiave been c c " - : - l e b u i t 
of t h e c h j J d h o o d r h e u m a t i c t e v e r r e p o r t e d i in, aLuai.miieiiL < ; 
5 , '"I'llhJl a s t a t e m e n t by M i . H a r d y t h a t lie h a d n o h i s t o r y 
lor syTTIIif orri'i n f r ri I'd 11 »VA "IIHIIII] a ir d i ^MHSf i n i ln> s I j r\ i iir1! \ « i nil I rl ha11 
[been completely plausible to a physician who had access only lo 
the information in Attachment "A"; 
OIT4 
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II ' 
ifli, That further examinafionr a^ . .?. A isurfi as an 
exercise EKG or "•"• more drastic •• I,J a catheterization) 
w e r e n o t i n d j c d t e i j liny I l ie m l ni 'n i i i l , 1.1.111 i in I il Ihidt 
not performing such examinations or tests cannot be considered 
» m . - ill „ 
? That, according In I hi1 medical record IIHJIHIMI I O 
Attachment "R" hereto, Lynn Hardv had undergone exercise EKG's as 
||i e c e j i i , II y r.is A I N U I I I I'll I n Il I  In mi I ' S i i l I n f t h o - a ? t- n e r r i s e 
EKG's were negative (i.e.f nol indicative i;»l symptomatic heart 
(disease) ; 
it 
I * i Ill"11 .i" i ' , j " ' i ;"/" 1 1 11 \i L ri i ;• " , J , i \ ' ) ' J e" . . ) a < ', \"" - II*•' * i e * 1 1 : » |, • H T «•?•" 
"whcse c a t h e t e r i z a t i , o n in, 1974 had i n d i c a t e d n e a r - 1 c t a 1 occ 1 usiori 
I'jf t h e ir „ .iht c o r o n a l > t i i t r r iiiirli a modera te o b s t r u c t i o n of the 
I1 
jnrcumf lexcoronary a r t e i y (d s At t a c lima 11 L. 1,1 i e 1 i e c L s I vt u u 11, J i r i e \ > 
I I 
"ifiitilV s t i l l have been su f f e r ing from s i g n i f i c a n t a t h e r o s c l e r o s i s 
fin I t h u s I t l o i n s i g n i 1. u : a i i l l , h e a i , I ill i s e a b i 1 1 i n ' u q i u ' i l Il lMi I 
i 
ll I", "That Attachment "B" presents a person Il, as of 
'I 
i|Bii]gii,Lf I " IH I inip CT I i f f i i* i ii i  from s i g n i f i c a n t c o r o n a r y a t h e r o -
s c l e r o s i s (even il ht p r e s e n t l y was expe i ' i enc im | MM IIULIMM I i"i' 
ipymptoms or d i s a b i l i t y )
 f would c o n t i n u e t.o s u f f e r from s i g n i f i -
||.'*nt hi-iii I i I I se'rise , drill i roijSPT \'d1 i aj>l, W HI hi he deemed t o 
nave a 2-4^ annual chance of d e a t h Hi unit llioaii d i s e a s e — a . • . - . ' 
I • / . ' • 3 
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% 
substantially greater risk of early death than that of his typi-
cal contemporary. 
DATED this £•& day of September, 1984. 
ROBERT B. WRAY, M.D.J 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2£> day of 
September, 1984. 
rx^ $fr<p^ 
My commission expires 
I'lG-bb 
Residing at jACVC. QLJTLA-S 
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«{1«. Proposed Insured's n- ~'c — first, initial, last (Print) 
LJ&MQ 
I D . S e x i I B . «-><Jic v i w.< 
.> I f f l f f l ^ l Qr«« 
Address for mail ^ 
No. 4£*£LStreet A L — s L c u T 4 £ * & r c L . 
S*fS C C State ^ Z i p ^ ^ x / 5 
3. Q Single JJMarr ied Q Widowed 
• Separated Q Oivorced 
5b. For how longt 5a. Occupat ions^ 
**&*«. J&nfmL 
6. i f spouse is proposed for 
fspoui 
a. Name 
b. Date of birth| 
Mo. IDay j Yr. 
proposed for coverage, give s-v yix. 
IIVA! ' 
c. Age Place i«. 
of birth 
1$ 
Amt. of life 
ins. in force 
8a. Kirvl of policy I 8b. Initial amount 
. fyf? P+ c Tfpju \ *zc0. OPO 
9. Rating if not |10. Accidental de*t:> cove 
Standard 
rage 
a. Initial amt $ 
b. Rating Q 2 D 3 Q 4 Q 5 
7. For each child proposed for coverage give: 
First name & 1 Relation-1Oate of birth! Amt. of life 
initial 1 ship Mo. lOayl Yr. ins. in force 
a. [ 1 1 1 1 
b 
c. 
d. 
a. 
f. 
Insurance for a child will not start until the 15th day 
of life. 
| 11. To apply for any of these Supplementary Benefits, give dttails: 
.Year Decreasing Term on Insured 
Initial Amount. 
• b. Year Decreasing Term on Q Spouse 
Q Insured & Spouse $ Initial Amount 
c Decreasing Term to Age 65M/68F on Insured 
$ Initial Amount. 
d. Decreasing Term to Age 62M.65F on Spouse 
$ Initial Amount. 
• Year Level Term on Insured $ 
• L •• vel Premium r ) Mod. Premium 
f. Family Income to th Contract Anniversary or. 
Insured $ per month. 
g. Family Income to 20th Contract Anniversary on 
D Spouse D Insured & Spouse $ per month 
h. Family Income to Age 65M/68F on Insured 
$ per month 
i. Family Income to Age 52M.SbF on Spouse 
$ per month. 
12. Beneficiary: 
Name 
j . Level Term on Dependent Children $_ 
k 0ption to Purchase Additional InsutanceS. 
 s* ^ y / A . (Do not complel* for a family or insured & Spouse Policy 
r^/revt. •//»&!>/ ^,^,J^ JUt&r. M*2Z~ (For insurance payable upon death of (1) the Insured, and (2) an insured child auer the death o f the Insured i
there is no insured spouse.) 
13. State any special request. 14. List all life insurance, annuities and variable con-
tracts on proposed Insured. (If NONE, so state.) 
Company 
CidQA j£&. 
Initial 
3T>t , . . _ _ _ 
Year 
issued
22_ 
Kind C.ife. 
End't .Gfoup) 
Med'i 
Y & 
a 
D 
15. Will this insurance replace or change any existing insurance or annuity in any company on any 
person named in 1a, 6 or 7? If "Yes", give tho-*- names, name of company, plan, amount and policy Yes 
numbers. LJ 
16.f!; anyone applying for, or trying to reinstate, life or health insurance on any person named in la , 6 or Yes 
7 in this or any company? If "Yes", give amount, det<v!s and company. Q 
17. Does any person named in la. 6 or 7 plan to live or travel outside the United States and Canada Yes 
wrthin the next 12 months? If "Yes", give details. D 
18. Does any person named in 1a, 6 or 7 p'3n to fly an aircraft, glider, balloon or like device or, within the 
•St 2 years, has anv such person flown a* a student pilot, pilot ot crew member or had any other Yes 
duties aboard an aircraft, gMiinr. balloon or like device while in flight (including flight for flight pay)?.. Q 
If "Yes", complete Aviation Questionnaire. 
19. Has any person named in 1a or 6, within the last 12 months: Yes> 
a. been treated by a doctor for or had a known heart attack stroke creancer other than of the skin?— D 
b. had an electrocardiogram for chest pain or for any other physical complaint, or taken medication 
for high blood pressure? D 
20. Premiums payable Q .Ann. Q Semi-Ann. • Quar J j ^ o n . f"3 PaV- Budg. G pf'^-M >tic D Gov't. A: 
21. Amount paid $ / £ / . &f~ D None (Must be "None" if either 19a or 19b is answered "Yes") 
22. Is it understood that a medtcel examination will be made on any person named in 1a, 6 or 7? If "Yes' 
on whom? 
Yes 
23. If 22 is "Yes", is it agreed that no insurance will take effect on anyone until all medical examinations Yes 
are made, even though 21 shows that an amount has been paid? / G 
24. Changes made by Home Office. 
The proposed Insured declares that, to the bert of his or her knowledge and belief, the above statements s 
complete and true. When Prudential gives a receipt form. ORD 223L5 79. of the same date as this Part 1, cover a 
will start as shown in that form. Otherwise, no coveuiyc will >tart unlos: (1) a contract is issued. (2) it is accept*-
end (3) the full first pi erbium is paid while all persons to be covered are living and t eir health r-jmains as stated 
Parts 1 and 2. If all these take place, coverage will start on the contract date Any entry in 24 made at a Home Off" 
will be approved by acceptance cf the contiact. B i * .vhee the law requires written consent for any change in tt 
application, such a change can be «n»»de only if ;nose who *ign this form approve the change in writing. No age 
can mine or tfnange a curfnai'i, tn w ^ i * w •**< ?".*»» r>>j;i'.;*.r;qjijs Q: needs. 
OWNERSHIP: Unless otherwise isk*d :or a' ovc. the o.-.ner of the contract will be (1) the applicant if other than * 
proposed Insured, otherwise (2) the proposed Insured. 3-jt this is subject to any automatic transfer of owners! 
stated In the contract. 
Application 
madeaj^v 
, fy-> /?j ^ State , „ .. I S i g n . W e of Proposed Ir; 
^Ms£Lq*.t (MA \±4r?&4i 
Insured 
JL Y. ..»&• 
itneseed b/Licdnsed Agent (Wr/JJnj Witnesl 
Signature, 
nrj Representative) 
Suinaty^yTAppiicaf^/f othor than proposed lnsure< 
^V//.//, 
*n\ H * l «m <v wO<po<ynr. utMiT tt«m« o* company! 
Lp<_ 
r\nrv 'iAt^'iJKX I , :.?-3- , . i « «r,d tain o< o K * * t ngmng lor fw«n or corporation) 
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IV/JJA; Uaety/ 
2. Forney record 
Hmor 
I rv ing' 
iibsuHiI Cause 
Deed 
[OftKfftX/UrH 
Afll Yeer 
Uving . Peed 
i4n frhrirvn 
Afit Yeer 
•rothen 
LuaEooi /Jf\ 
Sisters 
No m^KngJ JCL. 
a. Has your waight changed mora than 10 pound* in the paat yaar? , 
b. If "Yes". Gain fos. Loaa lbs. fteeeon for change 
c. How long h i the preeent weight baen tht aamt? 
YatD No£. 
4 Have you ever emoked? .kh?..<**rrM..*4.y*+^.r:A.fK*^/.*+# Yes ft No £ 
if "Yes" Qivt datt(t) tatt amokad: Cigsrettos Mo. Yr. Doers Mo. Yr. Pipe Mo. Yr. 
5. Whtn did you laat oonautt a doctor? Mo. f Yr. ? 7 (Give details In 12.) 
6. Art you now being treated or taking madicina tor any-condition or disease?. •VasDNo^ 
Haw you ever: 
• a. Jtad any surgery or baen advised to have surgery end have not done so? 
-av-been in a hospltil, sanitarium or other institution for observation, rest, diagnosis or treatment? 
e. iiguteity used or am you now using, barbiturates or amphetemines, msrijusns or other hal-
lucinatory drug*, or heroin, opiates or other narcotics, except as prescribed by a doctor? • 
d been treated or counseled for alcoholism? • 
S3, had (He or health insursnce declined, postponed, changed, rsted-up or withdrawn? Q 
t had Irfe or hearth insurance canceled or Us renewel or reinstatement refused? Q 
Yes Nc 
D & 
B D 
S 
5 
E> 
S 
I 
Have you ever been treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of: 
a. high Wood pressure? (If "Yes", state date found, rf drugs are used end if stHI being treated.) .. 
-b. chest pain, pressure or discomfort? (If "Yes", stats where tested, number of attacks, their 
duration, date of last attack end treatment) Q 
c. heart murmur or rheumatic fever? (If rheumatic fover, state number of attacks, date of laat attack 
and how long disabled for each.) Q 
d asthma, emphysema or tuberculosis? .• D 
0. tumor, cancer, leukamis, diabetes or ayphiHs? D 
1 nervous trouble, convulsions, epilepsy or mental disorder? Q 
Yes*o 
D CS 
& 
D 
C 
IS 
9. Other then as shown above, have you ever been treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of s 
Yes N 
s. Sidneys, bieddor, genital organs or urin-
ary tract? D F 
f. spine, joints, skull or other bones? D &? 
g. bfood, glands or akin? D ft 
h. ears, eyes, nose or sinuses? D Z 
\ or oUsotdsr of the: 
a. heart, erteries or veins? 
eV lungs, chest or throat? 
c. ferain or nervous system? 
d aver, geUWedder, atomach, intee-
t or rectum? ' • Q» 
10. Other then es shown ebove, have you in the pest S years: Yes h 
a. consumed or been attended or examined by any doctor or other practitioner? B L 
b. tied electrocardiograms, X-rays for diagnosis or treatment, or bfood, urine, or other medical 
easts? (If "Yes", stats dates, why made and by whom.) Q L 
c *n*dm oiahn tor or mam*** bmimMxm. compenaation. or a pamoion bocou— of m*kr*mm or kyury? Q R 
11. Do you now hsve s known sign of sny physical drtordsr, dieaees or defect not shown ebove? YeeQ N o p 
12. Whet sre the full details of the enswsr to 5 snd to seen pert of 6 through 11 which is enewered "Yes"? 
Illness or other reeson. 
K operated, so state. Resson for Time lost Full PRINT full names 
sny check-up, doctor's edvice, Began from normal recovery end addresses of 
Question No. treatment end medication. Mo. Yr. activities Mo. Yr. doctors snd hospitals 
— C ,? *> •*• e f r a ^ SZ-JU ^ ft.., C~ fr "7 "ffCii 4' UL- /L#3gag* \ y^*£~+- lo yrf c*ft* ~ 
ht^^y _LCLJ, 
fa iVeT-Mi.l W'U~"*' if / l V * V T — 
/ ) . u^farfpu 
m 
TTTi 
^
U 
"T^rs .i^ w7 <;. L° fc+te C+~t*<« 
I declare that, to the best of my knowledge end belief, the above statements srs complete and true. 
(Be sure you have reed ell the questions snd answers before signing.) 
Wrtnet 
Z 
I Signeture^et person examine* 
K £Z*^ w.^> V <*L_- *^ 
| Oste ' S 
i ature*! r  i e 
COMB 72 T-79H 
"7^ 
tf-33T ,19 ?/ 
TO CXAAfJNSt. Tt>« authorisation muet 6a eignod and dated by the propoaad Inaured 
AtmOPIZA7X>N 
i of 
To: Any lieenaed phytician. medcal practitioner, hoapital. dine or otttarmadicatry njiatad facility, inaurance company, the Medical mtermatton 
Bureau or other organization, inatmaion or pereon. 
So thai eligibility for Irfe or health coverage can be determined. I authorial you to give The toudenbei tounmce Company of America any data or 
recorda you may have about me or my mental or physical health. 
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WATKISS a CAMPBELL 
RICHARD B. FERRARI (Bar No. 1064) 
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64101 
(801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
8TATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL HARDY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ^ 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA and 
WAYNE L. RK3BY, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. C-83-7195 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA) 
I SS. 
COUNTY OF VENTURA ) 
MARILYN REED, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states: 
~" 1. That she is a former senior underwriting 
consultant of The Prudential insurance Company of America 
("Prudential") and, except as otherwise is indicated, ahe makeB 
O^' 
this Affidavit on the basis of her personal knowledge; 
2. That she was employed in the Prudential under-
writing department from 1973 until 1984 (with the exception 
of approximately fifteen months in the claims department) and 
is familiar with Prudential's underwriting practice during that 
period; y 
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3. That she was the senior underwriter in 
the processing of the application for insurance policy 
on the life of the late Lynn Hardy (which policy was 
approved for issuance on October 8, 1981)? 
4. That the medical history and physical 
examination of Lynn Hardy, taken in connection with 
his application, presented the following negative date: 
a first degree arterioventricular ("AV") heart block 
and a family history of cardiovascular disease; 
5. That the Prudential Medical Underwriting 
Manual does not provide debits for s first degree AV 
heart block of .22 second (such as Hardy's) (Bxh. "A" 
hereto) but does provide twenty to forty debits for 
a family medical history such as Hardy's (Ixh. HB" 
hereto); . v . . . 
6. That because of the absence of additional 
negative information, Hardy was assigned only twenty 
debits for family history; 
7. That the foregoing debits would not have 
justified even a Special Class 1 rating for Mr, Hardy, 
under the Medical Underwriting Manual's guidelines; 
8. That, had Prudential been informed of 
Lynn Hardy's 1974 heart attack, angiogram results and 
-2-
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other heart-related history, the Medical Manual's guidelines 
would have indicated at least Special Class 4 with 
a temporary extra premium to age fifty and she is certain 
he would have been rated accordingly; 
9. that ocassionally a Prudential underwriter, 
for competitive or business reasons, rates a policy 
lower (i.e., more favorably to the applicant) than 
the Medical Underwriting Manual would indicate, but 
no such circumstances appeared in the Hardy case; and 
10. That, because there would be no competitive 
or business reason for raising a rating; affiant believes 
it highly unlikely that a Prudential underwriter ever 
would rate an applicant higher than the Medical Manual 
indicated; 
DATED ..this //.day of January, 1985. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this //Say 
of January, 1985. /J- 1 
ys usi i\ > ^ > 
Notary Public 
My commission expirest 
/9u$. ?. rt*C 
Residing at: A?C >#y#g/fey 
OmCM. 1EAI 
Af£R. MARTINEZ 
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Ventricular Tachycardia: 
Paroxysmal ventricular tachycardia usually indicates organic heart disease and is cf pr*at 
underwriting significance. However, it is necessary to make a distinction between tht 
finding of ventricular tachycardia on a resting ECC in contrast to an isolated finding 
of two, three or occasionally more YFBs in a row without substantial duration or repetition 
especially during or just after an exercise ECC. It is the spontaneous ventricular tacnv-
cardia of some duration that points to prob.ible serious heart disease more than the exercij-t 
provoked short burst, although the latter also suggests a possibility of significant under-
lying heart disease. No case should be rated without an attending physician's statement, 
electrocardiogram and medical consultation. 
The rating for ventricular tachycardia should be the same as the angina rating (diagnosed by 
objective diagnostic findings). A short burst of VPBs on an exercise ECC may be accepted at 
50 debits, however, do not add these debits if the tracing is being rated for a positive 
exercise response as evidenced by S-7 segment changes. 
Sinus Arrhythmia 
This is a change in heart rate, transr.itted to the radial pulse, usually related to the phases 
of respiration, and of no significance under age 50. When marked, age 50 and over, a careful 
survey of the cardiac status is indicated, and an electrocardiogram is advisable for large 
amounts. 
Heart Elock 
This is due to delayed conduction of impulses through the heart. An intermittent pulse may 
result. In most cases it is recognizable only by electrocardiogram and the diagnosis should 
not be accepted without it. Occasional instances a history of block may be disregarded when it* 
is conclusively established to have been a transient toxic phenomenon of remote date. 
Condition stable 5 years or less or duration unknown: 
1st degree block 
PR .23-.24 -
PR .25-.30 -
PR over .30 -
2nd degree block -
3rd degree block -
*If heart rate 50-60/min. consider possibility of 10 point reduction. 
Condition stable over 5 years, debits may be reduced up to 25«. 
Condition stable over 10 years, debits may be reduced up to 50*. 
With known recent development or definite progressive prolongation 
increase debits 50 to 100 points. 
Stokes-Adams syndrome should be rejected. 
Age Under 4Q 
0 
30 
55 
80 
125 
40-49 
30* 
55 
80 
175 
225 
50 & Over 
55* 
80 
125 
225 
275 
(Rev. 10-80) 
Printed in U.S.A. 111-33 
1136 
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•3*'j&?j£jf-.'••'•'•: COTTONWOOD U.O.S. HOSPITAL 
;;;•-•-j-5'v••<• . - . . Murray. Ut»h 
: W DISCHARGE SUMMARY 
NAMf: 
A,>-
HARDY, LYNN F . 
HOSP. NO. 
0AT€ AOMITTEO: 1-5-74 
OATS OISCHARGEO: 1-15*74 
CHIEF COMPLAINT: Chest pain* 
PRESENT ILLNESS: Thia 34 year old truck driver was reportedly well until the past 
week when he had suffered from "flu" (muscle aching and fatigue). The afternoon of ad-
mission the patient developed a pressure-like anterior chest pain which radiated around 
both sides and down both arms. He was left a constant dull pain over the anterior chest, 
which was exacerbated by deep breathing. He was brought to the emergency room, where a 
cardiogram revealed significant ventricular premature beats and he was admitted to the 
Coronary Care unit to rule out a myocardial infarction. 
VITAL SIGNS; 
LUNGS: 
HEART: 
Positive findings on physical examination were absent. Patient 
was a slender young appearing male in no apparent distress. 
B.p. 140/90, pulse 68 per minute and regular. 
Clear to PSA. 
Regular with apparent murmur nor gallop. 
LABORATORY DATA: Fasting triglyceride 165. Electrolytes were entirely WNL. Serial 
enzymes revealed a CPK that was elevated to a high of 530 on the second day and graduall 
subsided. SCOT on admission 159, went as high as On admission LDH as 150 with aa 
high aa 525 gradually returned to normal. SGOT on admission was 21, elevated to as high 
of 130 and gradually subsided. Hgb. 15.6, Hct. 48.3, WBC's 8.900 with a normal differen 
ial. Urinalysis showed 3-5 RBC9s /hpf, and was otherwise negative. 12 channel showed i 
cholesterol of 323, glucose 88, creatinln 1.2, BUN 12, uric acid 4.5, calcium 9.7, phos-
phorous 4.5, tota- protein 7.5, SGOT 104, LDH 239. Repeat bilirubin normal at 0.7. 
Chest X-ray was interpreted aa normal. 
HOSPITAL COURSE: Patient was admitted to Coronary Care Unit, where over the next few 
days he was found to have episodic ventricular tachycardia. This was treated with IV 
Xylocalne medication and subsided. He did not have what appeared to be acute changes 
of a myocardial infarction on cardiogram, because of characteristic enzyme changes deter-
mined over several days, and the ventricular irritability, it was felt that he indeed hi 
suffered from a mild coronary. The only abnormality detected on laboratory work was a 
mild hypercholesterolemia. Patient was discharged from the CCU. on the third day, and 
convalesced without difficulty on the floor. He denied any further symptoms compatible 
with ischemia heart disease, nor congestive heart failure. Condition on discharge good, 
DISCHARGE DIAGNOSES: 1. Arteriosclerotic heart disease with an apparent acute myo-
cardial infarction* 
2. Mild hypercholesterolemia. 
3. Strong family history for early coronary death!* 
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D» .d Sundwalt, M.D. 
• Admitted 1-5-74 
OKAL HISTORY 
•• : • Physician: Reg. No. 
Sex: S.M.W.D. Occupation: 
ly History: 
• • ^ 
ler 
ler 
:hers 
:ers 
* !• • • • • • 
Age 
! 
Health9 i f l i v ing , or cause of death 
Note heredi tary or infect ions diseases 
Working Diagnosis: 
• 
U M M a W M m M M M H - M M M M M M M M M B M M i M i ^ M a M ^ M ^ ^ M M M M M M M M M H B M M B a i M 
TORY: (including present Illness and past history) 
it comp lalnt: 
IIEF COMPLAINT: Cheat pain. 
WILY HISTORY: Patient's father died of a coronary In his late 40fa. Patient 
has 3 brothers, two of whom have had coronaries, both in their 
)989 and one of whom has had open heart surgery, unknown reason. The patient has 5 childrer 
LI of whom are reportedly alive and well. 
&ESENI ILLNESS: This 34-year-old truck driver was reportedly well until this past 
week when he developed symptoms of "flu" (muscle aching and fatigue) 
tie afternoon of admission, the patient developed a pressure-like anterior chest pain which 
adiated around both sides ad down both arms. He states that this was a constant, dull 
sin, and was exacerbated by deep breathing. He was brought to the ER by his family, where 
e was found to have some cardiac irritability, and was admitted to the CCU to rule out a 
yocardlal infarction. Patient denies any associated nausea, vomiting, dyspnea,nor d£aphorc 
e states he has never had a similar pain. 
Patient has been generally well. 
Negative. J 
Vision good. 
Negative. 
Chronic cough, secondary to smoking. 
No known history of heart problems. 
Good appetite. No nausea, vomiting. Bowels regular. 
Negative. 
Negative. 
AST HISTORY: Unremarkable. Patient has been in good health except for usual' 
Infectious diseases and childhood illnesses. 
lab its: patient smokes 1 to 1-1/2 packs of cigarettes per day and has done for 16 years. 
tenies alcohol use except for occasion, 
ted i cat ions: none, 
allergies: none* 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: This Is a slender, middle-aged male, appearing somewhat older 
than his stated age, but lying comfortably in bed in no acute 
distress. 
ONWOOD HtA'ITAL 
EVIEW OF SYSTEMS: 
EUROLOGICAL: 
YES: 
NT: 
ESPIRATOBX: 
ARDIAC: 
I: 
U: 
XTREKLTIES: 
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COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
Name: Physician;. .Reg. No. 
(Physical findings: Head, Neck, Chest, Cardlo-Vasular, Abdomen, Genlto-Urlnary, Skin, Bones 
Joints, Glandular, NeuroptnuacuLr. Report findings completely). 
General Appearance: 
Weight: Normal 
VITAL SIGNS: 
HEAD: 
EYES: 
EOT: 
NECK: 
LUNGS: 
HEART: 
7% 
ABDOMEN: 
GENITALIA: 
EXTREMITIES: 
NEUROLOGICAL: 
ASSESSMENT: 
dth/1-6-74/1 
Present T. P. Re HI, Press. 
BP 140/90* Pulse 68/minute. REgular. Respirations 16/minute. 
Nonnocephalic without evidence of injury. 
PERRLA. Pupils somewhat miotic* E0Mfs Intact. 
Unremarkable. 
Supple. Full ROM. No venous distention. 
There are coarse breath sounds throughout all fields on auscul-
tation, but no dullness to percussion nor areas of consolidation. 
Regular without apparent gallop nor murmur. 
Scaphoid, soft and nontender. No masses nor organomegaly detect* 
Normal uncircumcised male. Testicles without masses. 
There Is chronic infectious-looking granulomata on the dorsum of 
the knuckles of the hands, and Ingrained dl and dirt in the hand1 
Lower extremities are free from any edema nor cyanosis. Periphe: 
pulses are brisk and intact. 
Grossly within normal limits. 
1. Chest pain, unknown etiology. 
Rule out myocardial infarction. 
2. Strong family history of arteriosclerotic heart disease. 
Must rule out congenital hyperlipidemia. 
David N. Sundwail, M.D-
P 00070 
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states the same contentions in nearly the same words as before.) 
Rule 60 does not permit mere re-argument of a decided case. 
deChabert v. Wheatley, 392 F. Supp. 62, 63 (D.V.I. 1975). 
Plaintiff again spends several pages mixing up doctors 
named Sundwall. (Pi. Memo, at 2-4.) Her persistent confusion 
of Drs. Val and David Sundwall is wearing a bit thin. The only 
physician who signed Hardy's Cottonwood Hospital records as his 
attending physician was Dr. David Sundwall (although a University 
Medical Center report three months later erroneously referred to 
Dr. Val Sundwall). (Frankel Afft., Exh. I at 00068-070, appended 
as Exhibit "III" hereto.) It is obvious that Dr. Val Sundwall 
knew nothing of Hardy's heart attack; he signed a Department of 
Transportation physical examination report in January, 1977—just 
three years after the attack--stating that Hardy had no prior 
history of heart disease. (Pi. Memo., Appendix at 20.) He 
either knew nothing of Hardy's heart attack or intentionally 
falsified an official report. (In either case, he would not have 
been a plausible source of information for Prudential.) 
Plaintiff next argues that Hardy "fully recovered" from 
his heart attack. Ctd. at 3-6.) Of couse, this begs the question 
Even if he had been asymptomatic, it is indisputable that he 
still sufferred from life-endangering atherosclerosis. (Memo. 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. XIV, §§6, 7.) 
8 
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